Will history repeat itself? – Raising the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales

Introduction

The debate over the minimum age of criminal responsibility (‘MACR’) in England and Wales has been at a stalemate for decades, with the age remaining at 10 since 1963.

On 18 May 2026, the Government published the Youth Justice White Paper[1], announcing that it would consider whether the current age of criminal responsibility remains appropriate in today’s society[2].

This is the first government-led initiative to review the MACR since 1969, when section 4 of the Children and Young Persons Act prohibited the prosecution of children under 14 for all offences except homicide[3]. This provision was, however, never brought into force[4] and subsequently repealed by the Criminal Justice Act in 1991[5]. In 1998, the Government went further by abolishing the doli incapax presumption, which had held that children aged 10–13 years were presumed incapable of distinguishing that an act was seriously wrong, unless the prosecution proved otherwise[6]. Since then, all attempts to raise the threshold, either by way of private members bills[7] or amendments to existing bills[8] have been met with stiff opposition by successive governments.  As such, if the MACR is raised as part of this new initiative, it will represent a significant policy shift.

The White Paper was followed by the Bar Council’s Report, ‘Reviewing the minimum age of criminal responsibility’[9]. The Report poses the central question – “whether criminalisation at such an early age is the most effective, proportionate or just response”[10]? It answers with a resounding no, calling instead for the MACR to be raised to 14 years. The Government has promised to carefully consider and respond to the Report as it assesses “whether, and when, it may be appropriate to explore reform in this area”[11].

The Bar Council’s findings somewhat jar with the Government’s tentative proposal merely to consider the possibility of reform. From a reading of the Report, raising the MACR is not only a well-supported and principled change, but one that should have been made years ago, aligning with international standards.

It raises the question: why are we still at a stalemate? 

Serious cases of young children offending

The debate on this issue is very rarely animated by shoplifting or low-level assault by young children – it is almost always driven by a small number of very serious cases[12].

The main argument advanced by those who seek to retain the current threshold is that there are certain cases which are so serious as to justify a lower MACR. In other words, it provides a failsafe for situations that provoke an instinctive criminal justice response. The abduction, torture and killing of Jamie Bulger in 1993 by two ten-year-old boys is one example and it continues to feature prominently in this debate. In fact, this fundamentally reshaped public and political attitudes towards this issue[13] and was undoubtedly responsible, in part, for the abolition of doli incapax[14].

A recent case which illustrates the impact of serious cases of youth offending on public and political attitudes is R v X, Y & Z [2026] EWCA Crim 845 (the ‘Fordingbridge Reference’). It concerned three boys who were convicted of multiple rapes and filming indecent images of two girls in Fordingbridge. The two principal offenders were aged 14 at the time. The third, who was convicted as a secondary party for his encouragement and filming of the rape of one of the victims, was aged 13. They were all given non-custodial sentences (Youth Rehabilitation Orders), which sparked national public outcry[15], and prompted the Attorney General to refer the sentences as unduly lenient.

Reflexively, cases such as Bulger and Fordingbridge invite the response, ‘hard cases make bad law’. While this may generally be true, given the complex legislative history and sensitivity of the debate, it is neither a satisfactory nor prudent rejoinder. These cases unfortunately reveal how young children can commit terrible acts and have seemingly galvanised public and political support for a lower MACR. There is, therefore, an uncomfortable question which must be confronted squarely because, ultimately, a judgement must be made on how we, as a society, wish to treat children. 

Does serious wrongdoing by young children justify the current age of criminal responsibility?

The argument that serious wrongdoing by young children ought to be addressed through the justice system rests on two broad claims. The first is an empirical claim: that 10-year-old children can differentiate between bad behaviour and serious wrongdoing. This has long been the theoretical rationale underpinning successive governments’ approach to the MACR[16].  The second is a public interest claim: that society values such cases being addressed through the justice system irrespective of the developmental capacity of the individual[17].

1) The empirical claim

The empirical claim is more easily answered. Firstly, it fails to accurately reflect criminal culpability. Culpability requires that an individual not only has an awareness of wrongdoing, but also the ability to regulate their behaviour[18]. Extensive neuroscientific and psychological evidence demonstrates that, at 10 years, the brain is developmentally immature and continues to undergo important changes for many years. These changes are crucial for impulse control and decision-making. Consequently, children in early adolescence are more susceptible to, and likely to engage in, harmful behaviour[19]. As the Court of Appeal recently expressed,

“Scientific evidence suggests that the brain continues to mature until at least the age of 25. Maturity brings a strong chance that an offender will stop offending. Those who continue to do so after that point are treated more severely for this reason…we would suggest that no-one could sensibly contend that children of 13 or 14 years of age should be treated in the same way as adults” [20].

Nevertheless, the age of criminal responsibility remains an outlier when compared to other areas of law governing children’s decision-making capacity. For instance, we regard children under the age of 16 as lacking the maturity to purchase a pet[21], but for the purposes of criminal responsibility, the law, as its starting point, treats 10-year-olds as possessing the ability to control and understand their actions.

Secondly, the empirical claim overlooks the effect of developmental immaturity on a young child’s capacity to meaningfully participate in criminal proceedings. The Bar Council Report highlights a seminal US study[22], which found that approximately one third of children aged 11-13 years and approximately one fifth of children aged 14-15 years had the equivalent capacity of seriously mentally ill adults who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial[23].

Indeed, the trials of Robert Thompson and Jon Venables exposed how the criminal justice system was ill-equipped to deal with offenders of that age. Thompson and Venables were 11 years old when they were tried and convicted of Jamie Bulger’s murder. They were prosecuted in the Crown Court with the full formality of an adult trial, save for several modifications to court procedure[24]. Notwithstanding these adjustments, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of their fair trial rights under Article 6(1) based on their inability to participate effectively in the trials[25]. Principally, this was because their immaturity and emotional disturbance[26] meant they were incapable of testifying properly or cooperating with their lawyers for the purposes of their defence[27].

The European Court’s decision reveals two apparent tensions between the common law and European human rights law. The first is a matter of legal principle. It was not disputed that the defendants’ level of impairment was insufficient to satisfy the common law test for unfitness to plead[28] and neither defendant sought to advance it pre-trial[29]. That test, which remains largely the same, asks whether the defendant has “sufficient intellect to be able to comprehend the proceedings so as to make a proper defence“; a formulation that, on its face, overlaps with Article 6(1) requirements. Yet, the European Court held that the adjustments made to court procedure were insufficient to secure the defendants’ effective participation. Accordingly, one of the primary domestic procedural safeguards for defendants with impaired capacity is set at too high a level, falling short of fair trial guarantees.

The second is a practical tension. Even if a child could satisfy the threshold for unfitness, they may only avail of that route in the Crown Court, which tries a small fraction of youth cases[30]. While the abuse of process jurisdiction is, in principle, available in the youth/magistrates’ court, it is a blunt tool. It resolves to a binary ‘stay or continue’ decision on an exceptional and discretionary basis, rather than a structured procedure for identifying and accommodating participation difficulties.

Notwithstanding the significant improvements made to youth justice practice in recent years, the upshot is that the common law fails to sit consistently with the requirements of a fair trial. As the Bar Council Report notes, “even in the courts, the adjustments that are available are inconsistently applied, variably received by children themselves and liable to fail in ensuring a fair process in which children can meaningfully participate”[31].

2) Beyond empiricism: the public interest claim

While the scientific evidence clearly supports raising the MACR, those in favour of maintaining the current threshold have, however, tended to make a values-based claim that empirical evidence cannot straightforwardly refute. The argument holds that society needs some formal, public, state-sanctioned response to acts of extreme harm regardless of the perpetrator’s precise cognitive maturity; that victims and communities have a legitimate stake in that response happening through the criminal law; and that public confidence in the justice system is itself a value worth weighing, even if it does not necessarily track the science on developmental maturity.

The approach to the sentencing of the three boys in the Fordingbridge case aptly illustrates this tension between the public interest and the reduced culpability of children. 

The 13-year-old, Z’s case, is the most instructive for present purposes as it sits on the fault line of the Bar Council’s recommendation. Z was found by the sentencing judge to have ADHD, dyslexia, longstanding neurodevelopmental needs, a “significantly limited” understanding of consent and was described by the psychiatric evidence as highly vulnerable and at risk of misunderstanding, coercion, or exploitation by peers[32]. The judge placed significant weight on Z’s welfare and his developmental capacity in deciding his sentence. The Court of Appeal held that Z’s sentence, which consisted of a Youth Rehabilitation Order comprised of various rehabilitation activity requirements, a Harmful Sexual Behaviour Intervention, a restraining order and a Sexual Offences Act 2003 notification, was not unduly lenient. It based this decision on his age, his secondary role in the offence and his vulnerability, noting that it was “a perfectly proper sentence” and one that “embodies the real importance of sentencing children in a materially different way from adults”[33].

2a) Arguments for retention

On one view, this case provides support for retaining a lower MACR. It might be argued, for instance, that if the MACR was raised to 14 years, it would result in an uncomfortable asymmetry, where Z could not have been prosecuted, while his co-defendants, X and Y, would have remained fully within the justice system. That argument has greater force when one considers Z’s likely sentence had he been found criminally liable as a principal. Following the Court’s reasoning on Y’s sentence which was increased, notwithstanding his “extreme neurodevelopmental impairment”, to 4 years’ detention, it is reasonable to infer that the Court of Appeal would have felt compelled to impose custody on Z too.  

In any case, Z’s actual conduct was evidently very serious. It involved participation in a serious sexual offence against a child victim who the court found had suffered severe psychological harm[34]. The Court of Appeal considered that this clearly passed the custody threshold[35]. Removing Z from the criminal justice system entirely would have meant no Sexual Offences Act notification requirement, and no criminal restraining order backed by the coercive force of breach proceedings. On this view, a lower MACR might be considered necessary to ensure that children capable of serious harm remain subject to the protective mechanisms of criminal justice system.

Although not relevant to the facts of Fordingbridge, a further concern related to the issue of public protection, is that raising the MACR would encourage the recruitment of children below the MACR for criminal activity resulting in impunity for those who exploit them[36].

Beyond public protection, it might also be argued that society has an interest in preserving a formal public record of such behaviour[37]. While such a function could be served by an inquiry, inquest, or a civil/family court, it is perhaps arguable that it would not have the same impact, or garner public confidence in much the same way as a criminal conviction does. This is, in essence, one of the reasons why we have the Attorney General’s reference mechanism. As the Court of Appeal recognised, references are made “for the purpose of the avoidance of gross error, the allaying of widespread public concern at what may appear to be an unduly lenient sentence, and the preservation of public confidence…”[38]. The fact that the case was referred to the Court of Appeal suggests that broader public and institutional appetite may currently lean against reform of the MACR.

Equally, there is a danger that victims view a care welfare response to such offending as institutional indifference to the harm they have suffered. Welfare/care-proceedings are focused on assessing a child’s needs and risk, rather than calibrating a response to the harm caused by the act. By contrast, sentencing guidelines require an assessment of harm to determine sentence severity. Victim personal statements feed directly into that assessment. As such, the harm caused to the victim could play a structurally smaller role in a welfare/care context.

2b) Arguments for reform

On the other hand, the Fordingbridge Reference could be seen as providing support for reform of the MACR. The argument that raising the age to 14 years would result in unjust cases of culpable 13-year-olds evading prosecution cuts both ways. Any line drawing exercise is bound to result in cases where a serious act, which if committed several months later, would have attracted criminal intervention. The more sensible question is, arguably, what age secures a greater proportion of fairer outcomes for less culpable children, not whether 10, 12 or 14 produces the lowest number of hard cases.

The Fordingbridge Reference also demonstrates the difficulty in assessing the developmental maturity of children at sentencing who, by that stage, have already been convicted of an offence. The doli incapax presumption provided at least a veil of protection insofar as the prosecution were required to prove that a young defendant had sufficient understanding of wrongdoing. Following R v JTB[2009] UKHL 20, the House of Lords confirmed that section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 not only abolished the presumption, but the defence of doli incapax itself[39]; no substantive defence has replaced it. As highlighted above, this substantive gap sits alongside inadequate procedural safeguards for considering a child defendant’s capacity to participate effectively in criminal proceedings. The result is that the degree to which a young child’s developmental immaturity has a bearing on their criminal responsibility is now, in the vast majority of cases, considered only once the harms of prosecution and conviction have been visited upon them.

The case for reform of the MACR is further sharpened by two distinctive features of the youth justice system. First, unlike adult justice, the youth justice system has a principal aim: to prevent offending by children and young persons[40]. Second, there is a corresponding statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of the child[41]. Any assessment of the case for reform to the MACR must therefore consider whether the current threshold facilitates these statutory objectives. To that end, the Government has expressly recognised that the current approach to youth justice is undermining the aim of prevention[42]. This is primarily because the criminalisation of young children results in stigmatisation and impairment of a child’s emotional and social development leading to entrenched cycles of repeat offending. As the Court of Appeal observed:

“A child’s brain and personality are still developing and when they have grown up and become mature adults, they may be unlikely to offend again. That development will be interrupted and adversely affected by many measures, especially custodial measures, which the criminal justice system unhesitatingly imposes on adults. The inability to fulfil their potential during what may be a critical stage in their education may reduce their life opportunities permanently which may be counterproductive, predisposing to further offending rather than preventing it…[43]”

Early non-criminal intervention and diversion: that is, intervention delivered outside formal criminal justice proceedings[44], is widely regarded as the key to preventing offending and reducing reoffending[45]. The Bar Council’s Report presents evidence showing that, in other jurisdictions, raising the MACR and thereby expanding the use of non-criminal interventions led to better rehabilitative outcomes for young children[46]. This is consistent with research on recidivism, which identifies timing and depth of contact with the criminal justice system as “the strongest predictor of persistent offending”[47].

However, this does not squarely address whether non-criminal interventions can adequately protect the public from serious harm caused by 10–13-year-olds. The statistics offer a measure of reassurance in that regard. The number of children sentenced by a criminal court between the ages of 10-14, from March 2024-2025, was 1,646[48]. Of these 1,646 children, only 22 received sentences of immediate custody[49] and none below the age of 12 received custodial sentences[50]. This suggests that risk in this cohort is generally considered manageable in the community which, at least in principle, can be effectively administered through care and welfare routes.

Even in more serious cases where a child’s behaviour poses a significant risk to others or themselves, confinement may be imposed under the Mental Health Act 1983 or through secure accommodation orders and deprivation of liberty orders. While these alternative mechanisms raise their own practical concerns[51], they offer a suitable framework for managing serious risk without the damage and stigmatisation which attaches to criminal sanctions. Z’s sentence itself arguably centred on supervision and rehabilitation, not detention, which is substantively closer to a welfare-oriented outcome. Sexual risk orders, too, may be imposed by civil courts. Taken together, this suggests that risk management in a serious case need not depend on criminal conviction.

The argument that a lower MACR discourages the recruitment of children below the MACR for criminal activity may be responded to in three ways. First, criminal gangs already engage in this practice regardless of the MACR. Even Sweden, which recently voted to reduce the MACR citing public concern over increased gang activity, lowered its threshold only slightly from 15 to 14 years. Second, the criminal law already possesses the tools to respond to such exploitation through provisions criminalising child exploitation and modern slavery. Third, and most fundamentally, children recruited into criminal activity are, in such circumstances, properly understood as victims rather than offenders. Treating them as culpable actors risks compounding their exploitation rather than addressing its root cause.

A separate objection is that the absence of a punitive element would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. However, non-criminal intervention does not necessarily mean that children who have engaged in wrongdoing will escape all punishment. There is likely to be a punitive element in any measure designed to address harmful behaviour, particularly those family and civil measures which restrict liberty.

In any case, public confidence is not solely tied to securing a particular punitive outcome; it is fundamentally achieved through the observance of a fair system and process. The Bar Council Report points to three ways in which the present MACR has a bearing on fairness. The first goes to the root causes of offending. The Report highlights how young children in contact with the justice system are amongst the most vulnerable and disadvantaged in society, often entering the justice system due to factors outside their control, such as poverty, family instability and exploitation. Where a child’s conduct is substantially shaped by circumstance rather than by choice, holding them fully criminally responsible sits uncomfortably with the notion of a fair system.

A second related, but distinct concern is the disproportionate impact of the current MACR on black and minoritised children who are often treated like adults[52] and perceived as inherently prone to criminality[53]; a pattern which undermines faith in the criminal process.

Third, the Report presents, in addition to its findings generally on developmental maturity, extensive research on the prevalence of neuro-disabilities and developmental disorders amongst young defendants, which frequently impede meaningful engagement in criminal proceedings. As such, there is “a strong ‘ethical imperative’ for reform”[54] driven by the need to secure fairer outcomes for some of the most vulnerable and marginalised in society. It is this fairness, not the presence of punishment, that should sustain public confidence in the system.

Additionally, while participation in a fair process is essential for victim confidence, it does not necessarily follow that it must be a criminal process. Non-criminal interventions can be accompanied by a range of additional measures and support services to ensure that victims feel heard, respected and supported. As such, the issue is how we design such a system with victims in mind, not whether it remains criminal in nature. This invites the challenge that any process organised around a victim and an identified perpetrator is, in substance, a criminal one regardless of its label, and that such a process would be no less stigmatising for a child. However, a criminal finding, unlike a care or welfare order, carries consequences that attach to the child as an ‘offender’ indefinitely, regardless of subsequent reform. This formal labelling has a significant, well-documented effect on a child’s emotional and social development[55] and can itself drive further offending, as noted above. Taken together, it is therefore possible to remove the harmful consequences of criminalisation for children while still supporting victims.

A further aspect of public and victim confidence is whether the harmful behaviour actually stops. It follows, as suggested above, that if the evidence suggests rates of reoffending are more effectively reduced by intervention outside the justice system, raising the MACR should improve, rather than diminish victim confidence. According to a recent survey, 65% of respondents and 61% of victims of crime believed the MACR should be higher than 10[56]. While such support may, in the face of a concrete case such as Bulger or Fordingbridge, waver, it nevertheless suggests that we may now be at a point where scientific consensus, legal policy and public opinion have converged.

Conclusion

The problem of how we deal with the serious, hard cases of offending by young children is, to a large degree, the reason why this debate has been deadlocked for decades. However, there is now evidence of a greater desire for its reform.

There are broadly four possible outcomes of the Government’s review.

The first is that it remains unchanged. It is reasonable, given the history of this issue, to conclude that the Government will, once again, defer a decision on the MACR. Even when provision was made for the MACR to be raised to 14 years in 1969, it was scrapped. Since then, governments have shied away from the issue, deterred by public attitudes following cases such as Jamie Bulger’s murder.  

The second is that the MACR will be raised slightly, most likely to 12 years. The last time the MACR was raised in 1963 from 8-10 years, it reflected a compromise between the Conservative government’s position, which took the view that no change was required, and the “widespread feeling” that the MACR should be raised to at least 12 years, in line with the 1961 Ingleby Report[57]. This change would align Scotland and some European countries, but not with UN guidance[58].

The third is that the MACR is raised, but with a carve out for serious offences, in effect, marking a return to 1969. This is arguably the most politically likely compromise as it would ostensibly accommodate both sides. However, a carve-out does not resolve the problem, it simply relocates it. A child’s ability to control their behaviour and participate in the criminal process does not increase because their offending is severe. Under this option, criminal responsibility would effectively be determined by the category of offence rather than the child’s capacity.

The fourth, and in my view preferable outcome is that the MACR is raised to 14 years in line with Bar Council’s recommendations, without a serious offence exception. This is not because the arguments for retention of the current MACR, canvassed in 2a, lack force. Rather, it is because the issue turns on what is the most fair, proportionate and effective response to address the harmful behaviour of young children. The public interest does not necessarily depend on that response, even to serious cases, being criminal. The public interest rests, fundamentally, on a fair, well-resourced system that adequately manages risk; one that care, and welfare mechanisms are capable of delivering.

It will be some time before any decision is taken. The Government will not move forward with any proposal until the report of Professor David Ormerod CBE KC (Hon) is completed, which is expected in August 2027. That delay is not empty time. If the growing consensus among practitioners and campaigners is to translate into reform, the case for a genuine care and welfare approach needs to be made. That requires confronting the difficult and sensitive questions this debate raises.

Sources and footnotes

[1] Ministry of Justice, Cutting Youth Crime. Changing Young Lives. The youth justice system reform and delivery plan (CP1585, May 2026).

[2] Ibid, p. 5.

[3] The intellectual roots of section 4 go back to a Labour policy proposal which advocated for a radical shift away from criminal prosecution toward care proceedings for young offenders. See HC Deb 11 March 1969, vol 779, col 1176; see also White Paper, Children in Trouble (CP3601, 1968).  

[4] Section 4 was to be introduced gradually by statutory order. However, the change of government from Labour to Conservative following the 1970 election meant that a commencement day was never appointed.

[5] Section 72, Criminal Justice Act 1991.

[6] Section 34, Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

[7] Lord Dholakhia made a series of attempts to raise the MACR to 12 years in the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill. All but one failed to survive second reading in the House of Lords, and the 2017 Bill fell awaiting second reading in the House of Commons.

[8] Amendments were tabled by several peers to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 (Amendment 220), proposing to raise the MACR to 12, and the Crime and Policing Bill 2025 (Amendment 469) which proposed raising the MACR to 14. All failed.

[9] The Bar Council, Reviewing the minimum age of criminal responsibility, June 2026, available here: https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/static/d20936d5-f1b7-431d-b90e6c009947291e/Bar-Council-MACR-report-25-June-2026.pdf

[10] Ibid, p. 5.

[11] (n 1), p. 63.

[12] For instance, see HL Deb 5 February 2026, Vol 852, cols 1740-1765; HL Deb 21 January 2026, Vol 842, cols 272-275; HL Deb 17 November 2021, Vol 816, cols 241-277. Section 4 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, which carved out an exception for homicide is a further example. That proposal to limit the provision only to cases of homicide faced significant opposition from MPs who believed it should extend to other serious offences, see HC Deb 9 June 1969 vol 784, cols 1072-1085.

[13] See HL Deb 8 September 2017 Vol 783, col 2202. In the mid to late 90s, there was growing public concern about the rise in youth crime. In response, the Labour government set out a new approach to tackle youth offending, encapsulated by the White Paper, No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime (CP 3809, November 1997).

[14] In 1995, the House of Lords reversed a Divisional Court ruling which had held that doli incapax was no longer part of the common law on the basis that it could only be abolished by Parliament. In doing so, they commented on the political climate noting that the debate “has popular and political overtones” and that “it is not so much a legal as a social problem, with a dash of politics thrown in”, see Re C (A Minor) [1995] UKHL 15, paragraph [74].

[15] Over 300,000 people have signed a Change.org petition calling for the sentencing judge to be investigated over the initial sentences imposed, see https://www.change.org/p/investigate-judge-nicholas-rowland-and-introduce-a-judicial-accountability-framework-now.

[16] See HL Deb 8 September 2017, vol 783, cols 2187-2212, 2209; HL Deb 29 January 2016 vol 768, cols 1554-1578, 1574; HL Deb 8 November 2013, vol 749, cols 443-500, 487; HC Deb 18 December 2012, col 686.

[17] The public interest arguments typically advanced are that: the public requires protection from such acts; serious wrongdoing deserves to be punished; the justice system offers greater flexibility in how it deals with children; a criminal trial serves as an important public record and recognition of awful behaviour; and the public and victims should have confidence in the justice system. See, for example, HL Deb 5 February 2026, Vol 852, 1760-1765; HL Deb 21 January 2026, Vol 842, cols 272-275; HL Deb 17 November 2021, Vol 816, cols 257-263; HL Deb 29 January 2016 vol 768, cols 1574-1579; HC Deb 18 December 2012, col 686; HC Deb 8 April 1998, Vol 310, col 372.

[18] This is reflected in sentencing guidelines. See Sentencing Council, Sentencing children and young people, 1 June 2017, paragraph 4.5.

[19] For a comprehensive analysis of the scientific literature, see The Bar Council Report, p. 15-21.

[20] R v X, Y, Z [2026] EWCA Crim 845, paragraph [139].

[21] Section 11, Animal Welfare Act 2006.

[22]  Grisso, T., Steinberg, L., Woolard, J., et al., ‘Juveniles’ competence to stand trial: a comparison of adolescents’ and adults’ capacities as trial defendants’ (2003). Law and Human Behavior, 27(4), 333. See (n 9) p. 20.

[23] (n 9), p. 20-21.

[24] The defendants were shown the courtroom prior to trial and given a “child witness pack”; they were seated next to social workers in a specially raised dock so they could see the courtroom; their parents and lawyers were seated nearby; the hearing was shortened to reflect the school day; and regular breaks were afforded. See T v United Kingdom App No 24724/94 and V v United Kingdom App No 24888/94, reported as a joint decision in (2000) 30 EHRR 121, paragraph [9].

[25] It was also argued that their trials amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR. The Court held, by twelve votes to five, that there had been no violation of Article 3.

[26] Thompson was found to have been suffering from PTSD at the time of the trial and did not receive necessary therapeutic work following the offence. In Venables’ case, there was evidence he had the emotional maturity of a younger child; that he was too traumatised and intimidated to give an account to his lawyers or the court; and that he was unable to follow or understand the proceedings.

[27] Ibid, paragraphs [88] and [90].

[28] Ibid, paragraphs [58] and [60].

[29] The test is derived from the 1836 Pritchard case; see M [2003] EWCA Crim 3452, paragraph [28].

[30] See (n 9), p. 32

[31] (n 9), p. 34.

[32] (n 20), paragraph [64].

[33] (n 20), paragraph [157].

[34] (n 20), paragraph [150].

[35] (n 20) paragraph [157].

[36] For example, Sweden recently voted in favour of lowering its age from 15-14 years in response to exploitation of children by gang members. See Euronews, Swedish lawmakers cut age of criminal responsibility to 14 ahead of general election, 13 August 2026, available at https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/13/swedish-lawmakers-cut-age-of-criminal-responsibility-to-14-ahead-of-general-election.

[37] A similar argument was raised by Lord Faulkner in 2021 in relation to the Bulger case. See HL Deb 17 November 2021, Vol 816, col 258.

[38] (n 20), paragraph [4].

[39] R v JTB [2009] UKHL 20, paragraph [36].

[40] Section 37, Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

[41] Section 44(1), Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

[42] (n 1) at 3.34. See also Youth Justice Statistics, which states that the rate of children who reoffend is 30% higher than it was 10 years ago (n 28).

[43] (n 20), paragraph [138].

[44] The plainest examples are welfare or care-led responses such as social service referral, family support and restorative approaches. However, it would also include processes typically deployed by youth justice agencies which fall short of prosecution, for example, police cautions and out-of-court disposals.

[45] (n 1), at 1.18, 1.19, 1.24, 1.26, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3, 3.12, 3.16, 6.7, 6.10; (n 9), p. 50-54.

[46] (n 9), at p. 52-53.

[47] (n 1), at 2.1-2.4. See also (n 9), p. 50-54.

[48] Youth Justice Statistics: 2024 to 2025 supplementary tables, Table 5.7 (available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/youth-justice-statistics-2024-to-2025).

[49] Ibid, Table 5.7.

[50] (n 1), at 3.112.

[51] See (n 9), at p.46-47 for a discussion on the concerns raised over secure accommodation orders and the recent increase in the number of deprivation of liberty orders.

[52] This phenomenon is known as adultification. It refers to “a form of bias where children from Black, Asian and minoritised ethnic communities are perceived as being more ‘streetwise’, more ‘grown up’, less innocent and less vulnerable than other children”; see YLAL, “They Should Know Better”: The Dangerous Impact of Adultification in the Criminal Justice System, available here https://younglegalaidlawyers.org/they-should-know-better-the-dangerous-impact-of-adultification-in-the-criminal-justice-system

[53] (n 9), p. 37-41. The Report provides a detailed analysis on the disparity in treatment and outcomes of black and minoritised children at every stage of the justice system, from stop and search to sentence and rehabilitation.

[54] (n 9), p. 53.

[55] (n 9), p. 20.

[56] Co-op Foundation, ‘What the UK Public thinks about children in the justice system’ (2026), (available at: https://www.coopfoundation.org.uk/wp-

content/uploads/MiC-research-report_FINAL.pdf), cited by The Bar Council Report at p. 5. See also 2024 YouGov poll showing that 68% of respondents were in favour of a higher MACR, with 32% voting for 15 or above, available here: https://yougov.com/en-gb/daily-results/20241018-1e47d-2.

[57] HC Deb 27 February 1963, Vol 672, col 1274.

[58] UNCRC, General Comment No.24, CRC/C/GC/24, September 2019, paragraph [22].